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Because an employer's difficulty in satisfying labor demands is likely to depend on how fast those demand rates are growing, a more rapid and uneven growth of employment should be expected to increase the imbalance in individual labor markets. This occurs, in part, because it is harder to find applicants with the right attributes as the number of positions to be filled increases. In addition, the employer's discharge (fire) and quit rates are likely to rise with the new hires rate. Thus the mean and variance of employers' employment growth rates are likely to condition the extent to which labor markets are in imbalance and hence have an impact on the correlates of this imbalance. 2 Virtually all studies that have tried to explain the disappointing wage and productivity developments of the 1970s and other characteristics of The second part of the paper uses both cross-area and aggregate data to identify the possible causes of the observed growth in labor market imbalance. The principal new finding of this investigation is that the sharp increase in the growth rate of employment at a given rate of unemployment contributed to the growth of imbalance in U.S. labor markets.4 In the third part of the paper both cross-area and time-series data are used to assess the effect of the growth in labor market imbalance on the key macroeconomic phenomena of the past decade. The evidence derived from these two distinct types of data implies that the spurt of imbalance in U.S. labor markets during the 1970s played a role in both the outward shift of the Phillips curve for the United States and the reduction in this country's rate of total factor productivity growth.
The last part of the paper summarizes the primary results about the degree, location, causes, and effects of labor market imbalance during the past decade.
Labor Market Imbalance over Time and across Areas
In this section I describe growth in labor market imbalance by using Beveridge curves, which portray the relation between employers' difficulty in satisfying their labor demands (because of high turnover or shortages of workers with particular qualifications) and the degree of unutilized labor supply. I also present evidence on imbalance in the United States as a whole and in the individual regions.
THE IMBALANCE CONCEPT
Beveridge curves are shown in the diagram below relating employers' difficulty in retaining and hiring the requisite work force, as reflected in Unemployment rate, U a job vacancy rate, V, to the relevant rate of unemployment, U. It is assumed that V is a function of the amount of turnover (fires and quits) and shortages per employed worker. The downward slopes of these curves indicate that, all else the same, the higher (lower) is the rate of unemployment, the easier (harder) it is for employers to satisfy their labor demands. Beveridge curves 1 and 2 describe the relation under consideration for two periods when all else was not the same. As the diagram indicates, for a given U (say, U*), employers' difficulty in satisfying their labor demands is greater in period 2 (V2) than it was at the same U in period 1 (V,). The outward shift in the relevant Beveridge curve between periods 1 and 2 indicates that labor market imbalance, as defined in this study, is greater in period 2 than it was in 1. What factors cause an outward shift in a Beveridge curve? On the supply side of the labor market, anything that makes labor force members less able or less willing to fill the existing set of jobs would lead to an outward shift. Many observers have pointed to the decline in the portion of the labor force made up of prime-age males as one key determinant of the outward shifts in Beveridge curves in the 1970s.5 On the demand side, a faster rate of employment growth-for reasons such as substitution away from some factor such as energy whose price suddenly skyrockets, a more rapidly changing skill mix, or a changing geographic locus of jobs-can cause outward shifts in the V/U curve by increasing job turnover and labor shortages at a given rate of unemployment. Thus faster employment growth and, possibly, greater variability of growth rates across industries or areas could cause an outward shift in the Beveridge curve.6
IMBALANCE SPURTS IN THE 1970s
In the discussion below, U is measured by the unemployment rate of prime-age males. This choice follows the Phillips curve literature, which has moved from using the total unemployment rate to a rate that controls for the growing importance of women and young workers in the labor force. The Beveridge curve shifts to be documented are even more pronounced if expressed in terms of the total unemployment rate.
Employers' difficulty in satisfying their labor demands, V, is proxied by help-wanted advertising per employee in all sectors and by the discharge (fire) and quit rates in manufacturing. The help-wanted index can be expected to reflect the difficulty of filling vacancies. Discharge and quit rates are taken as indicators of employers' ability to retain needed labor once secured. Although none of these variables is ideal, taken together they offer a reasonable picture of the problems employers are having in filling vacant jobs and keeping them filled. Figure 1 shows the relation between the normalized help-wanted index-the Conference Board's index of help-wanted advertising divided by nonagricultural employment-and the unemployment rate for primeage males.7 Between the end of the 1960s and the mid-1970s, this Beveridge curve shifted outward by a sizable amount-a claim supported econometrically by tabular data below. The shift implies that employers had to devote more resources to meeting their labor needs, presumably because of a greater inability to attract certain kinds of labor or because of greater rates of employee turnover.
Some have argued that trends in the normalized help-wanted index are distorted by developments such as a declining relative cost of helpwanted advertising, the growth of advertising in certain newspapers in the index because of the closing of other papers, an increase in the importance of occupations that rely relatively heavily on help-wanted advertising, or an increase in affirmative action pressure to advertisejob openings. Below I report on cross-sectional results based on the helpwanted index that support the aggregate time-series evidence of figure 1. In addition, the data on discharges and quits, shown in figures 2 and 3, are consistent with the type of shift indicated by the aggregate helpwanted data.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics gathered data on the turnover in manufacturing industries until December 1981. The BLS collected, but never published, information on discharges, defined as "terminations of employment initiated by the employer for such reasons as incompetence, violation of rules, dishonesty, laziness, absenteeism, insubordination, failure to pass probationary period, etc.' '8 Figure 2 displays the relation between these discharge rates in manufacturing for 1959-81 (the only years for which discharge rates were available) and the unemployment rate for prime-age males in the economy as a whole. The figure reveals 8. U.S. BureauofLaborStatistics,HandbookofMethods, Bulletin l910(Government a sharp outward shift in this Beveridge curve between 1969 and 1973; for a given rate of unemployment of prime-age males the discharge rate, and presumably associated costs, were substantially higher by 1973 than they had been until 1969.
Quit rates provide another indicator of the difficulty employers in the manufacturing sector have in retaining workers; these were derived by the BLS in the same survey of turnover that produced the discharge rates. Figure 3 presents Beveridge curves for the relation between quit rates and the unemployment rate of prime-age males for 1958-81. This figure, like the preceding one, implies that employers' difficulty in retaining a work force at a given rate of unemployment grew sharply between 1969 and 1973. Table 1 that caused V and V U to grow much more in some regions of the United States than in others.
CHANGING LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS ACROSS AREAS

The Determinants of Growth in Labor Market Imbalance
The next task is to investigate why labor market imbalance grew when and where it did. As stated earlier, it is very likely that the difficulty employers face in meeting their labor demands will increase the faster their demands grow. With rapid growth, it will be more difficult to satisfy skill requirements as the old sources of labor supply become inadequate to fully keep up with the new demand. In addition, employers with high employment growth rates are likely to confront high rates of turnover as high rates of new hires are accompanied by high discharge and quit rates. The discharge rate will be high because many workers will be passing through an explicit or implicit probationary period, and because employers will hire with less care when struggling to expand their work force rapidly. The quit rate will be high because the quit probability is generally greatest among employees with short job tenure. Table 3 presents annual percentage growth rates of employment for U.S. regions in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s; it also presents each region's share of national employment at the beginning of these decades. The most striking fact in this table is the very fast rate of growth in the Southwest during the 1970s (5.0 percent a year); during this decade the share of national employment in the Southwest rose from 7.2 to 9.1 percent. The only two regions in which employment growth accelerated in the 1970s were the Pacific and Southwest, the same two regions that showed the highest imbalance growth in table 2 as measured either with the vacancy proxies or the change in the help-wanted index.
THE CHANGING REGIONAL LOCUS OF EMPLOYMENT
The relation between the difficulty employers have in satisfying their labor demands and the level and change in the growth rate of their work forces can be addressed by assuming that the percentage change in the normalized help-wanted index is a good surrogate for the percentage change in the job vacancy rate. Making this assumption, I used 1961-80 data for the twenty-five states for which help-wanted advertising data fit equations containing permutations of the mean, mean squared, and variance of the state employment growth rate. The estimated coefficients from these regressions imply that the geographic variability in growth rates had only a minute effect on the national level of labor market imbalance. This is most likely because the high imbalance in regions with rapid employment growth was approximately cancelled out by the low imbalance in regions with slow growth. Equation 4-3 drops the two cross-state summary statistics and adds comparable variables derived from employment growth in one-and twodigit SIC industries. 10The results are similar; the cross-industry variables reduce the estimated coefficient on the dummy for 1973 or later from 0.163 to 0.075. As was the case for the cross-state variables, the mean of the growth rates of employment across industries appears to be much more important than the variance in these rates.
The moments of the cross-state and cross-industry distributions of employment growth rates are highly correlated. Hence, even if growth in only one set caused increased imbalance, growth in either set might appear to have done so when the statistics are examined independently. When equation 4-4 includes both first and second moments of the crossstate and cross-industry data, it explains roughly the same amount of the imbalance spurt around 1973 as does equation 4-3. But now the distribution of employment growth rates across industries has no effect whatsoever on the normalized help-wanted index.
Equation 4-5 in table 4 includes other elements of the X vector-the percent of employment covered by unemployment insurance, the percent of the labor force that is female, the percent aged sixteen to nineteen, and the percent over age fifty-four. These variables permit one to ascertain, albeit crudely, whether the effect of employment growth on labor is likely to be due primarily to the omission of variables describing the characteristics of the work force. The estimated effect of employment growth in equation 4-5 is reduced to some extent by the inclusion of the controls, but remains sizable. Coefficients with expected signs were 10. Unbroken time series from 1959 to 1981 could be obtained for 30 one-and twodigit SIC industries from the "790" data series of the Bureau of Labor Statistics; these industries covered all employment in the private sector. Comparable variables could also be derived with information for 91 three-digit SIC industries. The choice between summary statistics based on the more detailed, but less inclusive, three-digit industry series or the less detailed, but fully inclusive, one-and two-digit series did not have a qualitative effect on the conclusions of the paper. obtained on all supply variables with the exception of the proportion of the labor force aged sixteen to nineteen. However, the estimated coefficient on this variable is insignificant and its negative sign may be an indication that youths are in the types ofjobs for which employers do not advertise heavily. Finally, results from equation 4-5 strongly suggest that the history of labor market imbalance over the entire 1959-81 period has to do with much more than the history of employment growth.
Shedding a Micro Light on Macro Findings
What happened to wage growth and total factor productivity growth in the 1970s across U.S. regions? Did the regions with greater labor market imbalance experience higher growth in wages and lower growth in productivity? Can the cross-regional findings contribute to a better understanding of the comparable aggregate relations?
WAGE GROWTH ACROSS REGIONS IN THE 1960S AND 1970s
Wage measures for different regions were developed to help answer some of these questions. Average hourly or weekly pay for men and women in detailed occupational categories (appendix B) in selected SMSAs (appendix C) were taken from the BLS area wage surveys for 1960, 1970, and 1980. The detailed occupational categories were grouped by the BLS into two large categories, "Maintenance, Tool Room, and Power Plant Jobs" and "Office and Clerical Jobs." To develop wage indexes corrected for variation in occupational mix, the area wage survey data were fitted to equations of the form where the mean of AWis 123.2 and the standard deviation, 9.7. Thus the cross-regional V, U, and AW data strongly imply that the key information coming from a labor market about the likely wage pressure is the degree to which employers are having difficulty in satisfying their labor demands. To the extent that an unemployment rate is correlated with employers' difficulty in fulfilling their labor needs, unemployment will be related to wage growth. But to the extent that the unemployment rate varies independently of the employers' difficulty in obtaining the labor they desire, it is unlikely to have a meaningful effect on the wage-adjustment process. To predict wage growth, it appears that the analyst will do much better knowing about employers rather than about the unemployed.
To say that vacancies matter more than unemployment for wage growth is not to say that wage growth is very responsive to V; in fact, it is not. In equations 7 and 8 the elasticities of AW with respect to V calculated at the means are 0.17 and 0.24, respectively. These estimates may be biased downward due to measurement errors in the V proxies. However, the cross-area findings imply that wage growth is not very responsive to labor market imbalance, even when allowing for a sizable bias and when viewing the imbalance from the perspective of employers.
The requisite time-series data are not available for determining the change in the V proxies used in equations 7 and 8 at a given U before and after 1973. 14. Inclusion of the square of the normalized help-wanted index had virtually no effect on this conclusion. wage feedbacks, the added inflation would be about twice this large. Moreover, in the table 6 equations that include both the inverse of the unemployment rate for prime-age males and the normalized help-wanted index, only the latter has a meaningful effect on wage growth. II The time-series results presented in table 6 are much more credible in light of the cross-area analyses presented above. Given the role of V in explaining cross-area differences in wage growth, after controlling for U, it makes very good sense that the marked outward shift in the national Beveridge curve around 1973 would have caused some outward shift in the Phillips curve for the nation. Note that the cross-sectional and the time-series wage-growth equations imply a similar effect of help-wanted advertising on wage growth, and hence a similar shift in the Phillips curve, allowing for the fact that equation 9 measures wage growth over a decade. Moreover, across regions the main determinant of wage growth appears to be employers' difficulty in satisfying their labor demands and not the rate of unemployment for the area. This observation gives crosssectional support to the idea that in an augmented Phillips equation including both V and U, only V really matters. Table 7 reveals some surprising facts about regional productivity developments. If productivity growth has been dominated by new capital, implying better capital and hence higher productivity, or by faster output growth, implying reduced slack or unutilized capacity and hence higher productivity, then total factor productivity growth would have been faster in the expanding Southwest and Pacific areas than in the declining Northeast and Middle Atlantic regions. However, table 7 indicates that the slowdown of total factor productivity growth during the three periods was at least as high in the Southwest and Pacific areas as in the Northeast and Middle Atlantic regions.
IMPACT ON TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH:
CROSS-REGION EVIDENCE
An important analysis of total factor productivity growth in manufacturing across U.S. regions has recently been completed by Hulten and
The results of table 7 are consistent with the idea that large spurts in labor demand are associated with high start-up costs. As discussed above, a rapid increase in labor demand is likely to be correlated with sharp growth in employers' difficulty in securing and retaining desired work forces; all else the same, this will be reflected in lower total factor productivity growth.
A pooled time-series cross-sectional regression of total factor productivity data on labor hours, both from The estimated coefficient of l in equation 11 indicates that the faster that manufacturers in an area were expanding their labor input, the lower was their total factor productivity growth; to be more specific, an area with labor growth that was one standard deviation above the mean had total factor productivity growth 16 percent below average. Apparently the rapid growth of labor in an area had strong positive relations with phenomena that reduce productivity-such as quits, discharges, shortages, and vacancies, as discussed above.
To examine one of these relations, the data from table 1 on vacancy rates and skill shortages were regressed on the labor hours entry of table 
NATIONAL EVIDENCE
Given the support from the area analysis, the idea that employers' difficulty in satisfying their labor demands adversely affects total factor productivity growth was applied to aggregate data. The variable to be explained was total factor productivity growth calculated by the American Productivity Center using government statistics on output, hours, plant, equipment, land, and inventories. The growth rate of employment and the new hires rate within manufacturing were taken as indicators of employers' potential problems with their labor input. The year-to-year difference in the logarithm of the Federal Reserve Board's capacity utilization rate and the prime-age male unemployment rate were used to account for cyclical effects on productivity.
Equation 8-1 of table 8 shows that, after controlling for trend factors and the rate of unemployment, total factor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector was about 0.9 percentage point lower starting in 1973. Equation 8-2 adds the change in the log of the capacity utilization rate, which has a very significant estimated coefficient of 0.6. Inclusion of the utilization variable reduces in absolute value the coefficient on the dummy for 1973 and later from 0.9 to 0.7.
Once cyclical and trend factors have been allowed for, the coefficient estimates for equation 8-3 indicate that employment growth per se has a substantial effect on total factor productivity growth. Adding the change in the log of employment variable changes the dummy for 1973 or later from -0.7 to -0.2. This decline in the unexplained drop-off in productivity growth since 1973 reflects two facts about the manufacturing sector. First, after controlling for trend, unemployment, and utilization changes, the faster growth of employment is associated with a slower growth of total factor productivity, as the cross-sectional results suggest. Second, with the same factors held constant, there has been a sharp increase in the growth rate of employment in the years from 1973 on.
The final equation, 8-4, in table 8 includes the new hires rate, which, all else the same, was much higher from 1973 to 1981 than in the preceding twenty-five years. Including new hires data brings the estimated coefficient of the dummy for 1973 and later to zero. The estimated coefficient of the employment change variable is reduced in absolute value but retains its negative significant effect on total factor productivity growth. This result has two implications: a higher new hires rate means lower productivity growth, presumably because of increased turnover, training, and so on; and other factors that reduce the productivity growth associated with employment growth are unrelated to new hires, such as shortages and retraining.
The cross-sectional and time-series results are both consistent with the basic idea that the growth of the labor input involves important adjustment costs. Hence the rapid growth of labor input from 1973 to the end of the decade seems to have contributed to the disappointing growth of total factor productivity.
Conclusions
Imbalance in U.S. labor markets appears to have grown markedly from 1973 onward. At a given rate of prime-age male unemployment, employers did much more advertising per employee to obtain the work forces they needed after 1973 than before. Moreover, if one holds the unemployment rate for prime-age males constant, the probability rose sharply that an employee, at least in the manufacturing sector, would be fired or quit. Thus employers' difficulty in satisfying their labor demands at a given level of unutilized labor supply appears to have increased substantially. This potentially important development was reflected by the business press. Between 1972 and 1981, when the rate of unemployment for prime-age males rose from 3.1 to 5.4, the lines of print in business periodicals discussing skill shortages rose by a factor greater than two (as reflected in a review of seventy-one periodicals). 17 In 1981 the number of lines of business press discussing skill shortages was almost double the annual average between 1965 and 1969, when the unemployment rate for those workers averaged 2.0 percent.
What factors caused this increase in labor market imbalance? Heretofore, most analysts have emphasized supply-side structural changes. 18 To date, however, little attention has been given to the fact that, since 1973, U.S. employment growth, adjusted for the cycle, has been much more rapid than would have been predicted from historical trends. It has been argued here that this rapid employment growth added to the job vacancies, new hires, and quit and discharge rates with which employers were confronted.
The extent of labor market imbalance is important in and of itself because it reflects the amount of unemployment that is "structural." Results developed here indicate that imbalance in the 1970s also contributed to an outward shift in the Phillips curve for the United States and its cycle-corrected rate of total factor productivity growth. As a result, for a given level of unemployment, inflationary pressure was greater and productivity growth was slower than they would have been otherwise.
On the basis of demographic trends, labor market imbalance should lessen in future years. The annual growth rate of the U.S. labor force is forecast to decline from 2. 18. Lilien, "Sectoral Shifts," is a notable exception.
share of the population aged eighteen to twenty-four declining from 19 percent to 14 percent between 1980 and 1990 and to about 12 percent by the year 2000. However, there are many other important issues that may affect the degree of imbalance. What are the ramifications of having a work force that has larger numbers of female and black workers than in the past? How will a technology based on microprocessors, robots, telecommunications, computer services, and other elements of electronic automation affect labor markets? What trade policies will be adopted by the United States and other countries? The operation of U.S. labor markets in the future will also depend on the answers to these questions. The basic technique in the CPS for measuring unemployment is to ask someone in the household two key questions about each adult. The first question is "What did X do most of last week?" Possible answers include worked, looked for work, kept house, was on layoff, was retired, and was in school. The other question, raised only for people who did not work at all last week, is "Did X do anything to try to find work in the past four weeks?"
As it actually works, only the second question matters. With a handful of exceptions, everyone who has done anything in the past four weeks to look for work is counted as unemployed. What is most remarkable is that only half the people who are eventually counted as unemployed are reported as looking for work or on layoff in the week before the survey. The others are keeping house, retired, in school, or ill. All these categories have probably contributed to the upsurge in unemployment as measured by the CPS in the following ways. Fewer people are keeping house, but those who are keeping house are probably more likely to consider the possibility of looking into a job in any fourweek period. The fraction of the population that is retired has skyrocketed, mainly because of decreasing mortality rates. Many of the retired, especially those under age sixty-five, are sufficiently interested in the possibility of working that they will look into a job at least once every four weeks. The fraction of young adults in school has grown manyfold in the past two decades. Unemployment has particularly increased for this age group. Young adults in school are especially likely to consider working during the periods when they are not in fact working. The fraction of the population that is not working because of poor health has grown, especially among older people. This group contains many people who look into work at least once every four weeks.
More generally, what has happened to the U.S. population in the past few decades has put a much larger fraction of the population on the economic margin between working and not working. Consequently, the fraction of the population that is not working at one moment, but has looked for work in the past few weeks, has grown. The measurement of unemployment in the CPI has picked up this trend. Other measures of conditions in the labor market have not been affected.
What should one conclude if it is indeed true that Medoff's findings say more about the technical issue of measuring unemployment than they do about labor market imbalance? First, CPS unemployment as measured is an interesting number and analysts should continue to look at it. It is worth knowing what fraction of the population is looking for work, even if some of the job-seeking activity is not the result of joblessness as it is normally conceived. Second, it is important to be aware that unemployment has diverged from every other labor market indicator. One should be cautious about recommending macro policies that focus on the CPS unemployment rate without being aware of what that rate measures. Third, as far as diagnosing the tone of the labor market for predicting wage inflation and the like, we can do a lot better than the CPS unemployment rate. Medoff amply documents the superiority of other labor market indicators in this respect. Fourth, as far as diagnosing hardship, the important changes that have occurred in American life should be kept in mind, such as better medical care, equality of roles and opportunities for women and men, and higher real incomes. Some of the signals from the CPS unemployment rate are telling us about these changes, not aboutjoblessness. Of course, cyclical changes in CPS unemployment are dominated byjoblessness-the forces I have been discussing operate slowly over decades, not in single years. All labor market indicators, the CPS unemployment rate among them, are in agreement that the past few years have been a period of extraordinarily poor conditions for job seekers in the labor market.
Robert M. Solow: The belief that there is more "structural unemployment" than there used to be-or that there will soon be more structural unemployment than there is now-is a hardy perennial. It surfaces without fail every time there is a stretch of high unemployment. The belief has several distinct sources, which no doubt explains why it is so popular: naive people of good will who simply cannot see unemployment as reflecting anything more complex than the characteristics of the unemployed; apocalyptic people who like to think that the economic system as we know it has exhausted its adaptive power and requires, at last, some fundamental reform; conservative people who really do not care much about unemployment but want to resist the tendency toward expansionary policy activism that prolonged unemployment might bring. All convex combinations of these three possibilities are conceivable. There is also a fourth: it might be true. The fact that, so far, the structural unemployment argument has proved false time after time does not foreclose a future success. There is nothing illogical about the idea: the adaptive capacity of the economy is not unlimited, and there might come shocks to demand or supply to which it could adjust only very slowly, or only with drastic changes in relative prices and relative incomes, so drastic as to be intolerable by many.
It is clear that Medoff does not fall into any of the first three categories I mentioned. I thought the paper presented an interesting argumentsuggesting a modest increase in structural unemployment in the 1970s, probably reversible in due course. The two findings I would like to discuss are, first, that the Beveridge curve for the United States shifted outward during the early part of the decade, perhaps to the tune of a couple of percentage points of prime-age male unemployment; and second, that the vacancy rate, or the best available proxy for the vacancy rate, is a better measure of labor-market pressure than the unemployment rate for use in Phillips-curve estimation.
One inevitable weakness of the paper is the necessity to use the normalized help-wanted index as a surrogate for the vacancy rate. Medoff had no choice, of course. I think he was quite right to do as he did. It is a slight weakness, nevertheless, because his scatter diagrams seem to show a discrete shift of the Beveridge curve sometime around 1973, rather than a slow back-and-forth movement along a higherdimensional surface. Then there is always the danger, as Medoff is perfectly aware, that this apparent shift reflects something that happened to the relation between the help-wanted index and the vacancy rate rather than between the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate. Medoff's cross-sectional regression, in which the acceleration of wage inflation between the 1960s and the 1970s across different regions is explained by the change in the help-wanted index across the regions, does indicate that there is something to the time-series regressions. But I would feel more comfortable if he had made a more determined effort to purify the help-wanted index of other influences that might have caused it to move to a higher level at about that time. Some of the obvious possibilities are: a drop in the relative price of newspaper advertising; the shift toward female employment, which might lead to more helpwanted advertising because women are less clued in to the informal job network; the shift toward service occupations, computer-type occupations, and perhaps other things. It is possible that there are regional differences in help-wanted advertising, so that the regional shift in employment discussed by Medoff could have something to do with it. If, as this paper strongly suggests, the help-wanted index is a very useful indicator of labor-market conditions, that is all the more reason why we should want to understand it as thoroughly as we can.
It occurred to me when reading this paper that it would be very interesting to see what has happened to the Beveridge curve in other industrial countries during the same interval of time. This would have two advantages. First, some countries do have vacancy statistics, so the detour through the help-wanted index can be avoided. (By the way, Canada appears to have both some vacancy data and a help-wanted index, so one might be able to learn something about their interconnection.) Second, international differences in the behavior of the Beveridge curve might suggest explanations of the forces moving it where it has moved. I dug a few figures out of the OECD's Main Economic Indicators and then discovered that my colleague Katherine Abraham had already been looking into the question, so she was able to help. Here is a crude impression. The Beveridge curve does appear to have shifted outward in the early 1970s in Canada, Japan, France, Finland, and the United Kingdom, but not in Germany or the Netherlands. There are some cases that are not so easy to classify. I would guess that there has been no shift in Sweden, but there probably has been one in Norway. Australia and Belgium are also moot: more likely yes for Australia, perhaps also for Belgium. For all these countries I presume the unemployment rate is the total rate, which might make a small difference. Anyway, I think there is an interesting research project here. For instance, it may be significant that the Netherlands and Belgium, which are probably too small for regional shifts to be very important, experienced no shift in one case and a small one at best in the other. (But it occurs to me that I may be naive; religious and linguistic differences could make even small countries exhibit strong regional effects.) West Germany, however, is certainly regionalized, but its Beveridge curve has been quite stable. I wonder whether employment has grown more uniformly across regions there than in the United States or other countries. Besides, I take it that Medoff's emphasis on uneven growth of employment across regions could easily be converted into differences across industries if the data were cut that way. These things are certainly worth looking into.
I have one or two comments to make on the use of the help-wanted index in the estimation of Phillips curves. There is nothing counterintuitive in the notion that V is a better variable than U in wage equations. We tend to think of U -V as a measure of the excess supply of labor, which would suggest that both variables would contribute statistically. But there is nothing shocking in the notion that the threat to employed workers-especially those with seniority, communicated by a high unemployment rate-might be fairly weak, whereas an employer who was trying to fill vacancies might be tempted to bid aggressively for workers, especially if there were a chance of creaming better trained or more experienced workers from nearby firms. It will take more experience with using vacancy rates and proxies for them as independent variables before we will know best how to handle this. The work of Medoff and Abraham is certainly an important contribution. I revert to the general structural-unemployment argument for a concluding remark. I have a notion that ordinary cyclical unemployment, if it is prolonged, can transform itself into structural unemployment. An economy that remains for too long at the high-unemployment end of its Beveridge curve may find the curve shifting adversely. The sort of thing I have in mind is that anyone who has been out of work for a long time loses touch with the informal job network, so the degree of friction in the labor market increases. It may also be that skills deteriorate with disuse just enough to make a visible difference in the match between jobs and unemployed workers when the demand for labor revives. I am not suggesting that this sort of thing-if it is real, which I do not knowis what happened in the United States during Medoff's sample period. In fact, in his figure 1 the beginnings of the adverse shift seem to occur in 1971-73, when the unemployment rate was not so very high. However, the Beveridge curve worsened more drastically after 1975 (suspiciously mirroring the 1958-59 track) when the unemployment rate was very high. It is possible that there is less here than meets the eye; but I hope this interesting paper is the start of a research program and not the finish.
General Discussion
Martin Neil Baily observed that a vacancy rate should be thought of as measuring a different dimension of tightness in the labor market from the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate describes the level of tightness in the labor market while the vacancy rate (or its proxy, the help-wanted index) is related to the rate at which jobs are expanding and hence describes the change in labor market tightness. After a prolonged period of slack, the two might appear to be sending out contradictory signals if the labor market tightens but still retains a great deal of slack. Baily also reported that there was an increased dispersion of unemployment rates across geographic regions in the 1970s in comparison to the 1960s, paralleling Medoff's finding of greater vacancy dispersion. But he could find no evidence that higher structural unemployment was due to industrial shifts.
Several discussants questioned the reliability of the help-wanted data used in the paper. Thomas Juster argued that only a small fraction ofjob openings is formally advertised, which makes the connection between help-wanted ads and true vacancies highly uncertain and possibly unstable over time. Albert Rees observed that his own research on the Chicago labor market with George Shultz showed that jobs for bluecollar workers are especially underrepresented in the help-wanted ads. Thus the trend in the help-wanted index might be biased upward relative to the trend in total vacancies because the ratio of blue-collar to whitecollar job openings has declined over time. He also noted that the turnover data for manufacturing represent a declining fraction of all workers as the share of manufacturing in total employment declines over time. William Nordhaus suggested that equal employment opportunity legislation may have contributed to a rise in help-wanted advertising relative to true vacancies as employers sought to demonstrate that their hiring methods were nondiscriminatory. Steven Braun reported that the number of major newspapers in the fifty-one cities from which the Lawrence Summers noted that the paper did not really provide a satisfactory explanation for the differing patterns of regional employment growth during the 1970s. One possible explanation involves the pattern of demand for the products of different regions. An alternative explanation would emphasize increasing wage rigidity. This is certainly suggested by the sharp relative increase in union wages observed during the decade. More generally, the problems of explaining regional differences in labor market behavior are worthy of further research.
